Tea: Supreme Ruler of the Morphemesⁱ

Thị Mã Quing,^a,b Kofi S. Ucks,^b,c Theodore D. Rinker^a,c

1. Introduction

As is well known since the publication of the seminal Wienerkreis Papers (cf. Zwicky et al. 1971), there are a number of English rootsⁱⁱ which behave in what might at first seem unexpected ways. In this paper we will propose a new unifying analysis of two important and hitherto unsolved problems in the much neglected field of satirical pseudo-scatopornolinguistics. This new analysis is principally based on a new, universal morpheme which we argue is an inherent component of the human Language Faculty (and human cognition in general), the universal root √ TEA69.

2. Who does all the fu–cking? Tea does all the fu–ckingⁱⁱⁱ

1. 1. Fu–ck him.
   2. Fu–ck Nigel Farage.
   3. Fu–ck those racist UKIP wa–nkers.
   
   
2. 1. Jail him.
   2. Jail Nigel Farage.
   3. Jail those racist UKIP wa–nkers.

However, as Quang points out, sentences such as those in (1) cannot be accepted as examples of real imperatives, which can be assumed to have a tacit subject you (2SG or 2PL), as is readily apparent from sentences such as (3) below.

3. 1. (You) jail him, guv(nor)!   [2SG]
   2. (You) jail him, guys!   [2PL]

Crucially however, true imperative argument structure forbids reflexivisation, as in (4).

4. 1. *(You) jail you.   [Request made to a police constable]
   2. *(You) jail y’all.   [Request made to two or more police constables at once]

What then, asks Quang, are we to make of sentences such as (5)?

5. 1. Fu–ck you!   [Request made to a UKIP member]
   2. Fu–ck y’all!   [Request made to several UKIP members at once]

Clearly, the subject of clauses such as (1) and (5) cannot be an unrealised second person pronoun. From these facts together with the inherent ambiguity in sentences such as (1b), which “can be interpreted either as an admonition to copulate with [Nigel Farage] or as an epithet indicating disapproval of that individual” (Quang 1971, p. 4), he deduces that there must be two homophonous verbs fu–ck. Following this dichotomy, Quang introduced the now commonly accepted nomenclature of referring to the two verbs as the transitive copulatory fu–ck₁ and the bellicose fu–ck₂, respectively.

Quang goes on to show that fu–ck₁ and fu–ck₂ differ not only in their semantics and acceptance of the second person as a tacit agentive argument, but that both also exhibit disparate selectional properties. Consider the examples in (6), taken from Quang (1971, ex. 26-29):

6. 1. Fu–ck these irregular verbs.
   2. *John fu–cked these irregular verbs.
   3. Fu–ck communism.
   4. *John fu–cked communism.

(See Quang’s paper for several other restrictions, e.g. that the subject of fu–ck₂ be definite and that fu–ck₂-clauses not be adverbially modified.)

Quang goes on to note that fu–ck is not the only morpheme to exhibit this disparate behaviour, and he proceeds to give examples showing that, among others, terms such as shi–t on and da–mn behave in parallel to what was discussed for fu–ck above. To us this is clearly suggestive of a deeper underlying pattern, in which certain roots can be selected to behave either like fu–ck₁ or fu–ck₂. Following the insights of Distributed Morphology (Halle & Marantz 1993), we thus propose that both fu–ck₁ and fu–ck₂ (and da–mn₁/da–mn₂ and shi–t on₁/shi–t on₂) have a common underlying root √ FU–CK3 (and √ DA–MN4, √ SHI–T5, respectively). Superficial differences such as those in clauses with a fu–ck₁ and fu–ck₂ interpretation then, are principally the result of incorporating √ FU–CK3 into otherwise different larger morphosyntactic structures.

As we shall see presently, the answer to the puzzle lies in the featural make-up of the tacit subject in the imperative structures under discussion. This necessitates that we return to the fundamental question of what exactly the subject of fu–ck₂-type clauses is. Quang notes one common hypothesis of the day (which he credits to Barbara Partee), namely that the subject of a clause such as (5a) is God. Quang is quick to dismiss this proposal however, because it leads him to expect that reflexivisation of objective divinity should be impossible. However, sentences such as those in (7) do appear to be grammatical and are very well attested indeed as we can confirm from our own recent quasi-episociomorphological door-to-door meta-fieldwork with two very nice young Mormonian gentlemen:

7. 1. Scre–w God!
   2. Da–mn God!
   3. Shi–t on God!

Further, Quang suggests that if God were the tacit subject of the clause, we would expect sentences such as (8) to be grammatical, but they are not:

8. 1. *Fu–ck himself!
   2. *Shi–t on himself!

We want to propose that the proposition of God as the subject in clauses such as (5a) is in fact nearly correct, but that the subject is actually a DP with the root √ TEA69, and the features [+sd (=supreme divinity), -animate] (pace Fillmore 1968). In comparison, the encyclopaedic concept and exponent God (while ultimately also derived from the root √ TEA69) is [+sd, +animate]. It is well known that reflexivity requires the subject to be [+animate], which explains why sentences such as those in (8) are ungrammatical.

Let us turn then to the problem posed by sentences such as (7). It is straight-forward why these should be grammatical, since the subject and object are clearly different. Their real meaning being something like (9) below.

9. 1. (Tea) scre–w God!

An anonymous reviewer^iv pointed out that the problem for our proposal lies not in explaining clauses with the subject God as those in (7), but in explaining why clauses such as (10) below should apparently be grammatical, given our proposition that their subject is Tea.

10. 1. Fu–ck tea!
    2. Bu–gger tea!

We submit that in clauses such as (10) the tacit subject Tea and the object tea are featurally distinct, in that while the object of these clauses is also a DP derived from the root √ TEA69 with the features [+sd, -animate], the object in these cases is clearly different in that it is also [+cheap]. This is easily proven by the fact that tea in clauses such as (10) can be qualified with adjectives which are also [+cheap] but not with those which are [-cheap]. Consider the disparity between the examples in (11) and their analogous structures in (12):

11. 1. Fu–ck shi–tty tea!
    2. Fu–ck Tescos’-own-brand tea!
    3. Fu–ck Nigel Farage’s tea!
    
    
12. 1. *Fu–ck awesome tea!
    2. *Fu–ck loose-leaf-assam tea!
    3. *Fu–ck Roman Jakobson’s tea!

The true subject of fu–ck₂-type clauses is clearly never [+cheap], which we see reflected in educated and intelligent linguists’ introspective intuitions that God may be the subject of such clauses. Since God has created everything and everything is his creation, this means that God can never be [+cheap]. Given that [+cheap] = λx.λy.∀P [∃z [z ⊂ y ∧ P(x) ∧ P(z) ∧ x is cheaper than z]], i.e. some object x is [+cheap] iff the owner/purchaser’s belongings y include some z such that all predicates P are equally true of x and z and such that that x is cheaper than z. Since God possesses everything including himself, he flouts the proper subset condition and thereby inherently fails to be cheap. On the other hand, tacit tea is automatically [-cheap] since it is a universal fact about human cognitive function that cheap tea requires a remark about its quality, thereby preventing it from remaining tacit, and giving us infelicitous (13a), while (13b) remains felicitous.

13. 1. *May the awful tea shi–t on shi–tty tea!
    2. May the good tea shi–t on shi–tty tea!

In light of these new insights, we dismiss Quang’s conclusion that imperatives such as (5b) are not to be analysed as full English clauses, but rather as a special type of ‘epithet clause’ consisting of only a V NP sequence. Our analysis fully integrates these clauses with the existing morphosyntax of real imperative clauses.

As should be quite obvious from our detailed description of these mechanisms, the same analysis can be extended to the problem presented by French fou––tre_1-10 (Gouet 1971) and Latvian pi–st (Lurba 1971), an exercise we leave to the reader, so that he may convince himself of the cross-linguistic cognitive universality of our analysis, without undue influence from our exceedingly persuasive prose.

2. Teaification: A Note on Intensitea

Following the widely known and well-studied cases of Fornicatory Insertion (see e.g. Shad 1971), illustrated in (14) and Expletive Infixation (see e.g. McCarthy 1982), illustrated in (15), Siddiqi (2011) more recently reports a new phenomenon, -a–ss-Intensification, illustrated in (16).

14. 1. That’s too fu–cking bad you lost your shi–t.
    2. It would be so fu–cking hilarious if Nigel turned out to be foreign-fathered.
    
    
15. 1. It’s abso-fu–cking-lutely unthinkable that Nigel will get elected.
    2. I will vote for Al Murray, what an in-fu–cking-credible mother-fu–cking legend.
    
    
16. 1. Nigel is just a lame-a–ss fascist pig.
    2. Adolf was a real bad-a–ss überfascist who hated foreigners, too.

As is apparent from sentences such as (17), Fornicatory Insertion, Expletive Infixation and -a–ss-Intensification can also target the very same phrase:

17. 1. Nigel is too abso-fu–cking-lame-a–ss laughable to take him seriously.

We propose that the reason Fornicatory Insertion, Expletive Infixation and -a–ss-Intensification can all apply in a cyclic (and in fact anti­anti­missile­missile­missile-type unlimited) way is because they are all specific instances of the same underlying but far more wide-reaching process, which we term Teaification.

As has been pointed out previously, Fornicatory Insertion, Expletive Infixation and -a–ss-Intensification are all highly limited in their environments. Fornicatory Insertion generally requires a structure of the type ADV___ADJ, where the adverb must be one of qualification, such as so, too or no (cf. Shad 1971). Expletive Infixation applies only immediately before a stressed syllable (cf. McCarthy 1982); and -a–ss-Intensification must modify an adjective and not be phrase final (cf. Siddiqi 2011). There are immediate connections to be drawn. The ban on phrase-final -a–ss-Intensification can be explained by its inability to receive stress, and thus it cannot occur in an environment where it would be required to receive tonic sentence accent. Its inherent stresslessness directly links it to the pre-stress environment of Expletive Infixation, which is a position which likewise can never receive stress, since it would otherwise produce a clash (cf. Hayes 1995). Finally, Fornicatory Insertion and -a–ss-Intensification are intrinsically linked by their targeting an adjective and their inability to be phrase final for various reasons.

Having established that all three of these epiphenomena of Teaification share a highly restricted environment, we now have the task of demonstrating that all of these are mere variations in exponency of the root √ TEA69. If we assume that in all three of these cases there is an underlying root √ TEA69 which adds an additional phrasal layer around its target constituent, we might expect that these instances should also be realisable by either the null exponent argued to be at work in sentences like (1), or the exponent tea from the examples in (11). The former prediction holds vacuously and ex sententia dei, the latter we see borne out in the examples given under (18).

18. 1. That’s too tea trainy choo-choo-tastic!   [A real utterance by a 7 year old train nerd]
    2. Flanders has crossed the line, abso-tea-lutealy crossed the line!
    3. Nigel is a fat-tea fascist pig!

The attentive reader will also realise how the utterances in (18) are inherently a tad more forceful than those in (14-16). This is due to the exponent tea requiring strong linking to the encyclopaedic entry of divine tea, and thereby what has been termed theodecrative. (Nota bene: The initial the in the words theos ‘god’, theology, and so forth is by far no coincidence. This is actually a meta-instantiation of Teaification, the difference in spelling being due to the terms late adoption from the French, who spell the word tea as thé.^v)

Now that it has been conclusively shown that Fornicatory Insertion, Expletive Insertion and -a–ss-Intensification are all epiphenomena of Teaification, there remain two questions, to be answered presently. First, why is √ TEA69 under some circumstances assigned the exponents fu–cking, frea––king, bloo––dy, da–mn, or a–ss and not the previously conclusively argued for null and tea exponents? Secondly, we have said that Teaification is in fact a more wide-ranging phenomena, begging the question on where else we see instances of this fundamental method for morphosyntactic augmentation. It turns out both questions are in fact closely related.

First, we can see Teaification apply in a wide environment, always operand on material already otherwise requiring an over exponent. However, Teaification cannot apply to an object which selects a null exponent. This is due to the restriction that exponency of Teaification is the very last operation operand in derivation, following even the assigning of verbiage to prosodic structure, and can thus not attract stress. This lateness is however what makes it such a utiliteaous device, since it allows the speaker to augment a phrase and inject strong opinionation after-the-fact, by-passing even requirements of pragmatic appropriateness and semantic consistency. Now, in which other unstressed, piggy-backed environments do we see Teaification? Principally, in addition to the environments discussed before, this is at both the left edge and right edge of any number of possibly contentious words. The examples in (19) illustrate but a small number of items exhibiting Teaification:

19. 1. “Absolitutealy!”, Ned said. (< absolute + √ TEA69 + ADJ)
    2. And then the calf sucked on its mother’s teat. (< tit + √ TEA69)
    3. Rightea, let’s kick Nigel’s butt in the General Election! (< right + √ TEA69)
    4. John loves the teatre. (< √ TEA69 + atrium)
    5. Ugh, fu–cking Gwendolyn always gets so teadeos. (< √ TEA69 + deo ‘god’)

Note that (19e) is not a counterexample to our proposal that Teaification cannot attract stress. The utterance is only possible with tonic stress on so, i.e. “fu–cking Gwendolyn always gets soooooooo teadeos”, involving what classical metrical theory would term de-stressing of the syllable [ti:], but what in reality is simply the inability of this exponent to attract stress in the first place due to not being present during the assignment of prosodic structure.

3. Conclusion

In this paper we have shown how positing the existence of a universal root √ TEA69 with various exponents and unique semantic and selectional properties solves and unifies a number of otherwise difficult to account for and disparate aspects of common verbal behaviour. While we primarily illustrated our findings through exemplifying its workings in the English tongue, the results are clearly also applicable to any number of other languages. The only language which presently still presents an analytical problem for our framework is Esperanto, and here the problem is clearly that even the couple of reputed native speaker children brought up by these linguistic egalitarians can’t speak the language properly. Most importantly however, our solution does not require the linguist to make any additional stipulations or assumptions on top of what is already commonly accepted as the core properties of the Language Faculty and human cognition in general, since the positing of a universal innate facility for √ TEA69 is as uncontentious an issue as could be among linguists, cognitive scientists, biologists and indeed teaologians alike. We anticipate that our tremendous discovery will be followed by experimental confirmation by one of the groups of researchers at the Large Neuron Collider in Witzerland—who are currently working off an earlier draft of this paper—very soon.

References

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Gouet, Michel (1971) Lexical Problems Raised by Some of the Foutre-Constructions. In Zwicky et. al. (eds.), Studies Out in Left Field. Edmonton, Alb.: Linguistic Research.

Halle, Morris & Alec Marantz (1993) Distributed Morphology and the Pieces of Inflection. In Kenneth Hale & S. Jay Keyser (eds.), The View from Building 20. MIT Press, Cambridge, pp. 111-176.

Hayes, Bruce (1995) Metrical Stress Theory: Principles and Case Studies. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Lurba, Andrzey (1971) The Prefixed Forms of Latvian Pist ‘Futuere’. In Zwicky et. al. (eds.), Studies Out in Left Field. Edmonton, Alb.: Linguistic Research.

McCarthy, John J. (1982) Prosodic Structure and Expletive Infixation. Language, 3 (58), pp. 574-590.

Quang, Phúc Ðông (1971) English Sentences Without Overt Grammatical Subject. In Zwicky et. al. (eds.), Studies Out in Left Field. Edmonton, Alb.: Linguistic Research.

Shad, Pani U. (1971) Some Unnatural Habits. In Zwicky et. al. (eds.), Studies Out in Left Field. Edmonton, Alb.: Linguistic Research.

Siddiqi, Daniel (2011) The English Intensifier a–ss. Snippets, Issue 23, pp. 16-17.

Zwicky, Arnold M., Peter H. Salus, Robert I. Binnick, and Anthony L. Vanek (eds.) (1971) Studies out in Left Field: Defamatory essays presented to James D. McCawley on his 33rd or 34th birthday. Edmonton, Alb.: Linguistic Research. Reprinted in 1992 by John Benjamins.

	“Green Tea” and the Evil Monkey of Structuralism—Zacharias Esteban von Ordoñez
	Features of Tea: A Potted History—Pete Bleackley
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